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bstract
We examine policy thresholds of information sharing for financial development in 53 African countries for the period 2004–2011. Public
redit registries (PCRs) and private credit bureaus (PCBs) are used as proxies for reducing information asymmetry whereas financial development
ncludes all financial dimensions identified by the financial development and structure database (FDSD) of the World Bank, namely: depth,
fficiency, activity and size. The empirical evidence is based on interactive generalised methods of moments with forward orthogonal deviations.
he following findings are established. First, PCRs and PCBs have negative effects on financial depth, with the magnitude of the former higher.
econd, contrary to PCRs which have insignificant effects, PCBs have a negative impact on banking system efficiency. Third, PCRs and PCBs
ave negative impacts on financial activity, with the magnitude of the latter higher. Moreover, both of their marginal effects are negative. Fourth,
CRs and PCBs have positive effects on financial size, with the effect of the former higher. While marginal effects are positive, corresponding
hresholds are not within range. Policy implications are discussed.
2016 Africagrowth Institute. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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. Introduction
The World Bank publication of April 2015 on world develop-
ent indicators has revealed that poverty has been decreasing in
ll continents of the world with the exception of Africa (Asongu
Kodila-Tedika, 2015). According to the report, many countries
n the continent are failing to attain the millennium development
oals (MDGs) extreme poverty target (Caulderwood, 2015;
orld Bank, 2015) despite over two decades of growth resur-
ence that began in the mid-1990s (Fosu, 2015, p. 44).
There is a wide consensus from recent literature that the
uality of growth needed to reduce poverty is positively dri-
en by financial development (Asongu, 2015; Asongu & DeE-mail addresses: asongusimplice@yahoo.com (S.A. Asongu),
acinta.nwachukwu@coventry.ac.uk (J.C. Nwachukwu),
imenvanessa@afridev.org (V.S. Tchamyou).
Peer review under responsibility of Africagrowth Institute.
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879-9337/© 2016 Africagrowth Institute. Production and hosting by Elsevier
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).oor, 2015). Unfortunately, access to finance in African finan-
ial institutions has been marred by substantial issues of surplus
iquidity (Saxegaard, 2006; Fouda, 2009), despite the intro-
uction of public credit registries (PCRs) and private credit
ureaus (PCBs) to mitigate the information asymmetry asso-
iated with financial development (Triki & Gajigo, 2014). The
nderlying measures towards reducing information asymmetry
ave fundamentally been linked to the imperative of increasing
nformation-sharing among banks in order to reduce adverse
election and moral hazard between lenders and borrowers. This
s supported by a large number of literature documenting that
asic financial access in Africa (like credit, payments, private
nd corporate insurance) has been substantially constrained by
plethora of factors that limit, inter alia: eligibility, physical
ccess and affordability (Batuo & Kupukile, 2010; Allen et al.,
011).There has been a considerable amount of theoretical studies
upporting the position that information asymmetry hereafter
A between lenders and borrowers affects financial develop-
B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
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ent by reducing the efficient allocation of capital (Jappelli &
agano, 2002). In essence, lenders are most often confronted
ith issues of adverse selection owing to their lack of informa-
ion on the characteristics of borrowers, especially when it comes
o risks associated with the investment for which borrowers
ant to mobilise financial resources. In addition, the concern
s even more worrisome when lenders are unable to control the
ctions of borrowers after credit has been granted. Accordingly,
borrower could decide to conceal the proceeds of the underl-
ing investment in order to reduce responsibility in event of
efault or prevent repayment of the underlying debt. Such ten-
encies are not exclusively present in insolvent borrowers since
olvent borrowers could also face the temptation of manoeuvring
o avoid complying with reimbursing financial obligations asso-
iated with the loan. Ultimately, in order for lenders to caution
gainst such risks, credits are often characterised with rationing
ctivity and high interest rates which have substantial adverse
onsequences for financial development, growth and poverty
lleviation. These downsides can be limited by the sharing of
nformation on borrowers’ solvency characteristics. PCBs and
CRs serve as brokers for this by providing the much nee-
ed information to banks. Consistent with Jappelli and Pagano
2002), by sharing information these brokers enable, among
thers: the efficient allocation of capital, relaxation of credit
onstraints and increase of credit market competition.
In the light of the above, there has been a substantial body
f the literature devoted to assessing (i) the role of IA among
reditors and (ii) the effect of stronger rights to information by
reditors. The former (i) has examined how the sharing of infor-
ation improves credit availability (Djankov et al., 2007; Brown
t al., 2009; Triki & Gajigo, 2014), reduces credit costs (Brown
t al., 2009), decreases rates of default (Jappelli & Pagano,
002), affects corruption-related lending (Barth et al., 2009),
nfluences antitrust intervention (Coccorese, 2012) and affects
yndicated bank loans (Ivashina, 2009; Tanjung et al., 2010).
he latter (ii) has assessed the role of stronger creditor rights in,
mong others: capital structure, risk-taking by banks (Houston
t al., 2010; Acharya et al., 2011) and bankruptcy (Claessens &
lapper, 2005; Djankov et al., 2007; Brockman & Unlu, 2009).
What is quite apparent in the above literature is the overwhel-
ing focus on regions where concerns about financial access are
elatively less severe. In essence, whereas the great bulk of the
iterature has been devoted to developed countries and the emer-
ing economies of Asia and Latin America, very little scholarly
ocus have been oriented towards Africa, a continent with the
owest level of financial development (Galindo and Miller, 2001;
ove and Mylenko, 2003; Barth et al., 2009; Triki & Gajigo,
014).
Galindo and Miller (2001) have provided macroeconomic
vidence to establish that countries with more advanced deve-
opment in credit registries are rewarded with less financial
estrictions relative to those with credit bureaus that are less
eveloped. Particularly, credit registries that are performing
ell, account for substantial decreases in a firm’s sensitivity in
nvestment decisions to ‘cash flows availability’, a typical proxy
n the literature for financial constraints. As for Latin American
ountries, the authors conclude that there has been a reduction
m
t
s
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n the performance of credit registries by about 50 percent of
ow investment decisions are sensitive to internal funds. Love
nd Mylenko (2003) have combined firm-level data from the
orld Bank Business Environment Survey (WBES) with data
n public and private credit registries to assess if: (i) from the
erception of managers and (ii) higher sharing of financing from
he bank, the existence of credit registries is negatively associa-
ed with credit financing constraints. Findings reveal that the
resence of private registries are linked to higher shares of bank
nancing and lower financing constraints, whereas the presence
f public registries do not appear to exert any significant impact
n underlying financing constraints. Barth et al. (2009) investi-
ate the impact of lender and borrower competition as well as
he sharing of information through credit registries/bureaus on
orruption in lending by banks using the WBES covering 4000
rms across 56 countries and private credit in 129 countries.
wo main findings are established. First, both information sha-
ing and banking competition mitigate ‘lending corruption’ and
he sharing of information plays a positive role in influencing
ompetition to curtail corruption in lending. Second, it is also
ound that the legal environment, firm competition and owner-
hip structure of banks and firms, have significant effects on
ending corruption. Triki and Gajigo (2014) have examined:
i) the impact of private and public credit registries on access
o finance by firms and (ii) the effect of PCR’s design on the
eriousness of financing constraints, in 42 African countries.
heir findings show that (i) access to finance is on average higher
n countries with PCBs, relative to those with PCRs or neither
nstitution and (ii) there is substantial heterogeneity in finan-
ial access and design of information-sharing institutions among
ountries with PCRs.
The above studies leave room for improvement in three main
reas: sampling, data and methodology. First, very few lines of
nquiry have been positioned on Africa, in spite of the continent
aving the most acute financial access problems. Consistent with
his idea, Love and Mylenko (2003) and Barth et al. (2009) have
ositioned their inquiries on four and nine African countries
espectively. Whereas Galindo and Miller (2001) involve no
frican country, Triki and Gajigo (2014) which is closest to the
resent study have based their analysis on 42 African countries
or the period 2006–2009. We fill underlying gaps by working
n 53 African countries for the period 2004–2011.
Second, the discussed literature above, as well as recent infor-
ation sharing (Houston et al., 2010) and IA (Ivashina, 2009;
anjung et al., 2010) literature has been limited to bank specific
easurement of constraints to financial access. We steer clear
f this literature by using all financial dimensions identified by
he financial development and structure database (FDSD) of the
orld Bank. These scopes include financial dynamics of depth
overall economic depth and financial system depth), efficiency
at banking and financial systems levels), financial activity
from banking and financial system perspectives) and size.
he plethora of dimensions has been documented to provide
ore complete policy implications (Asongu, 2014). In essence,
he fundamental objective of increasing (reducing) information
haring (information asymmetry) is to improve financial inter-
ediation efficiency and the sharing of information to boost
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ompetition and reduce information rents which could lead to
ore lending or financial activity (Pagano & Jappelli, 1993,
. 2019). Increasing financial activity and financial allocation
fficiency logically implies increasing financial depth and size
ithin an economy.
Third, the bulk of the literature has consistently failed to pre-
ent findings that are robust to endogeneity. Ivashina (2009, p.
01) cautioned that the proper examination of IA in the ban-
ing industry should account for endogeneity, in order to avoid
iased estimations and misplaced policy implications. For ins-
ance whereas Jappelli and Pagano (2002) have used Ordinary
east Squares while controlling for potential unobserved cross-
ountry heterogeneity, Triki and Gajigo (2014) do not go further
owards tackling inherent issues of simultaneity between infor-
ation sharing offices (ISOs)1 and the banking industry: “Our
esults show that ﬁrms in countries with PCBs report relati-
ely smaller obstacle in access to ﬁnance relative to those in
ountries with PCRs. However, this effect is not robust to con-
rolling for GDP per capita and the private credit to GDP ratio,
hich suggests that the presence of a PCB is not exogenous. In
ther words, the level of ﬁnancial sector development and the
reation of a PCB may be simultaneously determined.” (p. 75).
As highlighted above, it is important to recall that the posi-
ioning of this inquiry on Africa is due to scarce literature on the
ubject on the continent, in spite of (i) recommendations for a
ore scholarly focus on the underlying issues (Singh et al., 2009,
. 13) and (ii) growing concerns about whether African finan-
ial institutions are tailoring information from ISOs to improve
heir returns instead of increasing financial allocation efficiency
nd activity (Triki & Gajigo, 2014). In essence, the nature of
he connection between information sharing and bank lending
emains an open debate in theoretical and empirical literature
Jappelli & Pagano, 2002).2
The rest of the study is organised as follows. The background
nd theoretical underpinnings are presented in Section 2. Section
discusses the data and methodology. The empirical analysis,
iscussion of results and implications are covered in Section 4.
ection 5 concludes with future research directions.
. Background and theoretical underpinnings
ISOs which are also known as ‘credit reference agencies’
re institutions that collect information related to the obli-
ations of individuals and commercial borrowers from many
ources: public sources and direct investigation (for busines-
es), banks and credit card companies (for individuals) and retail
enders. The collected information is then consolidated after
ross-checking for a comprehensive report. Once the report is
stablished, it can be used by future creditors. The data from
1 For the purpose of simplicity, we used ISOs to denote both PCRs(PCR) and
CBs(PCB).
2
“On the whole, all three models agree on the prediction that information
haring (in one form or another) reduces default rates, whereas the prediction
oncerning its effect on lending is less clear-cut” (Jappelli & Pagano, 2002, p.
020). As we shall see in Section 3.1, the corresponding lending dimension is
xpressed by the financial dynamics of allocation efficiency and activity.
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he reports on credit history is usually information of negative
nd positive nature, notably (i) positive information (entailing
etails on all open and closed amounts as well as on repayment
ehaviour) and (ii) negative information (consisting of mostly
nformation on default rates).
ISOs are essential for the provision of credit essential for the
rosperity of an economy because they enable the mitigating
f information asymmetries that limit the ability of lenders to
xhaustively assess the risk profiles of borrowers. On the one
and, data from credit histories enable the address of adverse
election that is apparent from creditors because they facilitate
he obtaining of reputational collaterals by creditors, especia-
ly in scenarios where exhaustive information is needed. On
he other hand, ISOs reduce moral hazard by tackling the con-
erns surrounding the unappealing behaviour from borrowers on
he repayment of their debts, thereby, strengthening default and
epayment rates. The ensuing increase in lending is crucial to
he sectors with substantial financial constraints such as micro,
mall and medium enterprises.
In accordance with Mylenko (2008), prior to 2008, ISOs were
or the most part restricted to a few countries in the Organisation
or Economic Cooperation and Development and Latin America.
fter 2008, the burgeoning of information and communica-
ion technologies has substantially favoured the establishment
f ISOs in Sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe and the Middle
ast and North Africa. Therefore, by 2008, with the exception of
outh Africa, few countries had ISOs in the Sub-Saharan Africa
egion. Some nations like Mozambique, Rwanda and Nigeria
ad also instituted credit registries with the core aim of strengthe-
ing banking sector supervision. Unfortunately, given the lack of
roper technology and incentives, timely and accurate informa-
ion was not often provided by these credit registries. However,
ith the growth of information and communication technology,
everal initiatives on introducing ISOs were taken across the
ontinent.
Consistent with Claus and Grimes (2003) and Asongu et al.
2016), there are two main theoretical underpinnings on the rela-
ionship between information sharing and financial access. The
rst articulates the transformation of bank asset risk characteris-
ics while the second is focused on the channels through which
iquidity from banks can be increased. Furthermore, the two
trands of the literature are consistent with the view that the fun-
amental role of a bank is to fulfil its financial intermediation
ole of transforming mobilised deposits into credit for economic
perators.
The connection between ISOs and financial access can be
nderstood from two perspectives, namely adverse selection
rom lenders and moral hazard from borrowers. ISOs avail len-
ers with information and credit histories on borrowers which
nable them to reduce high interest rates that are motivated by
dverse selection. When borrowers have been granted a loan,
hey become liable to moral hazard given that they can avoid
he repayment of their financial obligations towards the bank by
oncealing economic activities upon which the loan was gran-
ed. It is therefore the role of ISOs to discipline borrowers on the
egative consequences of non-compliance. Many times, ISOs
ducate borrowers on the inconveniences of debt default and
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erils of seeking refuge in the informal financial sector as a sus-
ainable alternative to the formal financial sector (Tchamyou &
songu, 2016).
. Data and methodology
.1. Data
We examine a panel of 53 African countries with data for
he period 2004–2011 from the African Development Indica-
ors (ADI) and the financial development and structure database
FDSD) of the World Bank. Data on public credit registries and
rivate credit bureaus is only available from 2004 and the last
ear in the financial development and structure database is 2011.
e acknowledge the fact that GDP figures may be unreliable
n some African countries. However, to the best of our know-
edge the World Bank is one of the most reliable sources of
ata. Consistent with the motivation of the study, baseline finan-
ial development indicators are transformed in accordance with
songu (2013, 2014) to obtain dynamics of depth, efficiency,
ctivity and size.
First, two indicators of financial depth entail: (i) overall-
conomic depth (M2/GDP) representing the monetary base plus
emand, saving and time deposits and (ii) financial system depo-
its (Fdgdp) in terms of liquid liabilities. We distinguish the
ormer from the latter because; a substantial portion of the mone-
ary base in less developed countries does not go via formal
nancial institutions. Second, by financial intermediation effi-
iency, we refer to the ability of banks to fulfil their fundamental
ole of transforming mobilised deposits into credit. Two measu-
ements are used, namely: (i) banking-system-efficiency (with
bank credit on bank deposits: Bcbd’) and (ii) financial-system-
fficiency (with ‘financial system credit on financial system
eposits: Fcfd’). Third, by financial intermediary activity, we
enote the bank’s ability to grant credit to economic agents. Two
roxies are also employed, namely (i) banking system activity
with ‘private domestic credit by deposit banks: Pcrb’) and (ii)
nancial system activity (with ‘private credit by domestic banks
nd other financial institutions: Pcrbof’). Fourth, financial size is
he ratio of ‘deposit bank assets’ to ‘total assets’ (‘deposit bank
ssets on central bank assets plus deposit bank assets’: Dbacba).
Consistent with Triki and Gajigo (2014), we measure infor-
ation asymmetry with public credit registries (PCRs) and
rivate credit bureaus (PCBs). In accordance with the underlying
iterature, there are six principal distinguishing features between
CRs and PCBs: access, data sources used, ownership, status,
overage and purpose. First, access to PCBs (PCRs) is open to
ll types of lenders (restricted to information providers). Second,
ata used by PCRs is obtained from bank and non-bank financial
nstitutions whereas PCBs includes: PCRs, courts, tax authori-
ies and utilities to the sources used by PCRs, for information.
hird, as concerns ownership, PCRs belong to central banks or
overnments, while the ownership of PCBs extends beyond the
nderlying institutions (governments or central banks) to len-
ers, independent third parties and lenders’ associations. Fourth,
hile PCRs are not profit-making registries, PCBs are principa-
ly established for profit. Fifth, whereas coverage provided by
t
t
r
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CRs is principally on large corporations and restricted in terms
f history and type of data (or information) provided, PCBs
xtend well beyond large corporations, to small and medium
ize enterprises (SMEs), which have longer histories and richer
ata. Fifth, while PCRs represent public institutions that are esta-
lished with the main mission of supervising the banking sector,
CBs are created because of demand for, and need of informa-
ion on borrowers in the banking market. Therefore, data from
CRs used to assess clients’ credit-worthiness could also be con-
idered as some form of by-product or collateral benefit of PCRs.
The control variables include: inflation, public investment,
DP growth, trade and foreign aid. These control indicators have
een substantially documented in the financial development lite-
ature (Osabuohien and Efobi, 2013; Huang, 2005; Asongu,
014). First, some major national macroeconomic policies such
s the maintaining of lower inflation and higher investment
ave been established to be favourable to financial development
Huybens and Smith, 1999; Boyd et al., 2001; Huang, 2011).
uybens and Smith (1999) and Boyd et al. (2001) have theo-
etically and empirically investigated the impact of inflation on
nancial development and concluded that economies with hig-
er inflation rates are likely to be rewarded with smaller, less
fficient and less active banks. Second, the nexus between invest-
ent and financial development has been assessed by Huang
2011) who has found a positive relationship. Third, some stu-
ies support the perspective that policies which are favourable
o openness in terms of external trade are positively associated
ith higher levels of financial development (Do & Levchenko,
004; Huang & Temple, 2005). Fourth, a plethora of papers
ave established the positive link between growth and finance
Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990; Saint Paul, 1992; Asongu,
015). According to the narrative, economic prosperity in terms
f economic growth is associated with a decreasing cost of finan-
ial intermediation owing to intensive competition, involving a
ubstantial scale of funds made available for productive invest-
ents. Moreover, the importance of income-levels in financial
evelopment has been extensively documented in the litera-
ure (Levine, 1997; Asongu, 2012). For instance (i) Jaffee and
evonian (2001) have shown that income levels have a positive
mpact on banking system structure and (ii) Asongu (2012) has
oncluded that African countries with higher income levels are
ssociated with better financial development. Fifth, analogous to
emittances (Aggarwal et al., 2011; Efobi et al., 2014), foreign
id that is spent in recipient countries and not captured by con-
ultancy services in advanced nations is more likely to boost
nancial development. It should be noted that expected signs
f the control variables cannot be definitely established because
he financial variables present contrasting dynamics. For exam-
le financial efficiency is, in broad terms, the ratio of financial
epth to financial activity (deposits/credit).
The definition and sources of the variables are provided in
ppendix A, the summary statistics in Appendix B while the
orrelation analysis in Appendix C. From the summary statis-
ics, we notice that (i) the means are comparable and (ii) given
he substantial degree of variation, we can be confident that
easonable estimated relationships will emerge. The purpose
f a correlation matrix is to avoid multicollinearity and over-
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arameterization issues that could substantially bias estimated
oefficients.
.2. Methodology
We adopt a two-step generalised methods moments (GMM)
ith forward orthogonal deviations instead of differencing as
mpirical strategy. This strategy is an extension by Roodman
2009a,b) of Arellano and Bover (1995) which has the positive
ides of (i) restricting the proliferation of instruments and (ii)
ontrolling for cross-sectional dependence (Love & Zicchino,
006; Baltagi, 2008). The endogeneity-robust empirical techni-
ue is important because as we have seen in the introduction
i) there are inherent issues of endogeneity in the modelling of
A (Ivashina, 2009) and (ii) Triki and Gajigo (2014) have also
dmitted in the introduction of their paper that they have failed
o take it into account.
The following equations in levels (1) and first difference (2)
ummarise the estimation procedure.
Di,t = σ0 + σ1FDi,t−τ + σ2PCRi,t + σ3PCBi,t + σ4Interi,t
+
5∑
j=1
5∑
h=1
δjWh,i,t−τ + ηi + ξt + εi,t (1)
Di,t − FDi,t−τ = σ0 + σ1(FDi,t−τ − FDi,t−2τ)
+ σ2(PCRi,t − PCRi,t−τ) + σ3(PCBi,t − PCBi,t−τ)
+ σ4(Interi,t − Interi,t−τ)
+
5∑
j=1
5∑
h=1
δj(Wh,i,t−τ − Wh,i,t−2τ)
+ (ξt − ξt−τ) + εi,t−τ (2)
here FDi,t is the financial development (depth, efficiency,
ctivity and size) of country i at period t; α is a constant; τ
epresents the rate autocorrelation; PCR, public credit registries;
CB, private credit bureaus; Inter, interaction among either PCR
PCR × PCR) or PCB (PCB × PCB); W is the vector of five con-
rol variables (inﬂation, public investment, GDP growth, trade
nd foreign aid), ηi is the country-specific effect, ξt is the time-
pecific constant and εi,t the error term. In the specification,
e prefer the two-step to the one-step procedure because it is
eteroscedasticity-consistent. Adoption of the GMM approach
resupposes that the number of cross-sections should be higher
han the number of time series in cross-sections (N > T) and the
ependent variables should be persistent. These conditions are
ulfilled because on the one hand 53 > 8 (2004–2011) and on
he other hand, the overwhelming persistence of the dependent
ariables is provided in Appendix D. Consistent with Brambor
t al. (2006) on the pitfalls in interactive regressions (i) all consti-
utive terms are included in the specifications and (ii) the effect
f the modifying variables (or ISOs) which should be within
ange is interpreted in terms of marginal impact.
t
f
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. Empirical results
.1. Presentation of results
In this section we present estimated findings. Tables 1 and 2
how results for financial depth (efficiency) whereas Table 3
eveals those for financial activity and size. We associate three
pecifications to each of the seven financial variables employed:
i) a baseline specification in which we assess the effects of
CRs and PCBs without interactions, (ii) a second specification
ith interactive PCRs to assess the marginal effect of increasing
CRs and (iii) a third specification with interactive PCBs to
xamine the marginal impact of increasing PCBs. It should be
oted that, in spite of PCRs being part of PCBs, we enter them
imultaneously into the first specification because they do not
uffer from issues of multicollinearity since their corresponding
orrelation coefficient is −0.14 (see Appendix C).
The specifications are tailored to avoid issues of instrument
roliferation by ensuring that the number of instruments for
ach specification is lower than the corresponding number of
ross-sections. We consider valid specifications as only those for
hich post-estimation tests confirm the validity of instruments
nd absence of autocorrelation in the residuals. First, for the
utocorrelation test, the second-order Arellano and Bond (1991)
est is preferred to the first-order because the latter is traditio-
ally expected to be significant. Second, in the event of conflict
f interest, the Hansen overindentifying restrictions (OIR) test
s preferred to the Sargan alternative because it is more robust.
e also complement the Hansen test with the difference-in-
ansen test for instrument exogeneity. It should be noted that
he Sargan OIR test is not robust and not weakened by many
nstruments whereas the Hansen OIR test is robust and weake-
ed by many instruments. Therefore, as highlighted earlier, by
nsuring that the rule of thumb on instrument proliferation is res-
ected, we also use the Hansen test to assess the exogeneity of
nstruments.
The left-hand-side (LHS) of Table 1 shows findings for ove-
all economic depth while the right-hand-side (RHS) presents
esults corresponding to financial system depth. The following
ndings can be established. First, while PCRs consistently have
negative impact on financial depth, PCBs exert a negative
ffect exclusively in the baseline regression of money supply.
he negative magnitude of PCRs is higher, relative to PCBs.
econd, from the interactions, whereas PCR interactions still
xert a negative effect on financial system depth, the effect of
CB interactions is positive, albeit not significant. It follows
hat; PCBs may be more instrumental in increasing financial
epth relative to PCRs. Third, but for GDP growth, the signifi-
ant control variables have the expected signs. Accordingly, as
e have justified in the Data section, public investment (Huang,
011), trade (Do & Levchenko, 2004; Huang & Temple, 2005)
nd foreign aid have been documented to be associated with
igher levels of financial development (Asongu, 2014).
In Table 2 on financial efficiency and IA, specifications on
he RHS for financial system efficiency are invalid because they
ail to align with the information criterion for the absence of
utocorrelation. First, we find that PCBs are significantly and
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Table 1
Financial depth and information asymmetry.
Financial depth
Economic depth (money supply) Financial system depth (deposits)
Baseline PCRs PCBs Baseline PCRs PCBs
Constant −3.917* −7.294*** −2.509 −3.838** −5.441*** −3.534***
(0.073) (0.001) (0.156) (0.040) (0.008) (0.009)
Money supply (−1) 1.115*** 1.083*** 1.003*** – – –
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Fin. system deposits (−1) – – – 1.056*** 1.099*** 1.035***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Public credit registries (PCRs) −0.236*** −0.146** – −0.162*** −0.143*** –
(0.000) (0.022) (0.000) (0.000)
Private credit bureaus (PCBs) −0.114*** – −0.052 −0.023 – −0.050
(0.003) (0.174) (0.297) (0.105)
PCRs×PCRs – −0.001 – – −0.001** –
(0.175) (0.033)
PCBs×PCBs – – 0.0008 – – 0.001
(0.180) (0.102)
GDP growth −0.176*** −0.182*** −0.179*** −0.092*** −0.094*** −0.101***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000)
Inflation −0.011 −0.008 0.004 −0.004 −0.012 −0.005
(0.359) (0.480) (0.717) (0.598) (0.204) (0.422)
Public investment −0.038 0.038 −0.043 −0.004 0.080*** 0.029
(0.337) (0.254) (0.167) (0.891) (0.005) (0.310)
Foreign aid 0.020 0.079* 0.023 0.083* 0.088* 0.075*
(0.696) (0.097) (0.661) (0.060) (0.073) (0.059)
Trade 0.042** 0.068*** 0.053*** 0.047** 0.042* 0.037***
(0.034) (0.001) (0.000) (0.020) (0.055) (0.000)
AR(1) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
AR(2) (0.881) (0.994) (0.350) (0.703) (0.629) (0.349)
Sargan OIR (0.004) (0.002) (0.052) (0.005) (0.012) (0.003)
Hansen OIR (0.253) (0.140) (0.318) (0.293) (0.154) (0.442)
DHT for instruments
(a) Instruments in levels
H excluding group (0.085) (0.162) (0.017) (0.382) (0.205) (0.112)
Dif (null, H = exogenous) (0.565) (0.228) (0.941) (0.284) (0.215) (0.778)
(b) IV (years, eq (diff))
H excluding group (0.435) (0.234) (0.243) (0.256) (0.317) (0.257)
Dif (null, H = exogenous) (0.137) (0.148) (0.536) (0.444) (0.103) (0.799)
Fisher 2332.01*** 2503.26*** 6921.22*** 3191.03*** 15,848.7*** 11,732.7***
Instruments 37 37 37 37 37 37
Countries 45 45 45 45 45 45
Observations 258 260 260 258 260 260
DHT: difference in Hansen test for exogeneity of instruments’ subsets; Dif: difference; OIR: over-identifying restrictions test; GDP: gross domestic product.
P-values in brackets. The significance of bold values is twofold: (1) the significance of estimated coefficients, and the Fisher statistics and (2) the failure to reject
the null hypotheses of: (a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests; and (b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test, Hansen OIR test and DHT
tests.
* Significance at 10% level.
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egatively linked to banking system efficiency whereas the effect
f PCRs is not significant. Second, the interactions among PCRs
nd PCBs respectively in specifications 2 and 3 are not signi-
cant. Third, the significant control variables have signs that
re expected and contrasting with those of Table 1 for reasons
lready provided in Section 3.1. In essence, financial depth (in
able 1) contrasts with financial allocation efficiency (in Table 2)
ecause it (for the most part) measures financial development in
erms of financial deposits (or liquid liabilities), whereas finan-
fi
o
iial allocation efficiency is the degree by which such deposits
re transformed into credits (or financial activity).
We discuss the results presented in Table 3 in two ways,
amely in terms of: financial activity and financial size. First,
s regards the findings of financial activity, the following can
e established. (1) Both PCR and PCB have negative effects on
nancial activity, with the negative magnitude of the latter higher
n the dependent variable. (2) Increasing PCRs and PCBs with
nteraction effects does not change the negative signs because
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Table 2
Financial efficiency and information asymmetry.
Financial efficiency
Banking system efficiency (BcBd) Financial system efficiency (FcFd)
Baseline PCR PCB Baseline PCR PCB
Constant 28.790*** 24.414*** 20.267*** 19.323*** 11.381*** 12.379***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.001)
Banking system efficiency (−1) 0.767*** 0.761*** 0.812*** – – –
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Financial system efficiency (−1) – – – 0.882*** 0.818*** 0.827***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Public credit registries (PCR) 0.148 −0.117 – −0.087 −0.160 –
(0.184) (0.618) (0.212) (0.146)
Private credit bureaus (PCB) −0.191** – −0.058 −0.443*** – 0.008
(0.029) (0.691) (0.000) (0.928)
PCR×PCR – 0.004 – – 0.004* –
(0.314) (0.051)
PCB×PCB – – −0.0007 – – −0.005***
(0.767) (0.000)
GDP growth 0.552*** 0.560*** 0.452*** 0.580*** 0.612*** 0.569***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Inflation 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** −0.013 0.099 0.031
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.878) (0.163) (0.706)
Public investment −0.405*** −0.301** −0.343 −0.175* −0.096 −0.140
(0.002) (0.037) (0.003) (0.089) (0.224) (0.137)
Foreign aid −0.612*** −0.399*** −0.273** −0.478*** −0.220*** −0.211**
(0.000) (0.004) (0.031) (0.000) (0.004) (0.017)
Trade −0.058** −0.015 0.004 −0.030 0.041 0.042
(0.035) (0.661) (0.874) (0.392) (0.219) (0.295)
AR(1) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.047) (0.142) (0.029)
AR(2) (0.120) (0.123) (0.138) (0.017) (0.020) (0.014)
Sargan OIR (0.209) (0.369) (0.107) (0.013) (0.000) (0.003)
Hansen OIR (0.598) (0.503) (0.421) (0.515) (0.168) (0.221)
DHT for instruments
(a) Instruments in levels
H excluding group (0.753) (0.554) (0.564) (0.381) (0.258) (0.201)
Dif (null, H = exogenous) (0.414) (0.422) (0.326 (0.555) (0.201) (0.321)
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))
H excluding group (0.676) (0.525) (0.325) (0.406) (0.390) (0.473)
Dif (null, H = exogenous) (0.340) (0.391) (0.583) (0.622) (0.080) (0.087)
Fisher 519.23*** 1410.72*** 4035.65*** 152.46*** 700.86*** 337.49***
Instruments 37 37 37 37 37 37
Countries 45 45 45 45 45 45
Observations 265 267 267 258 260 260
DHT: difference in Hansen test for exogeneity of instruments’ subsets; Dif: difference; OIR: over-identifying restrictions test; GDP: gross domestic product.
P-values in brackets. The significance of bold values is twofold: (1) the significance of estimated coefficients and the Fisher statistics and (2) the failure to reject the
null hypotheses of: (a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests; and (b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test, Hansen OIR test and DHT
tests.
* Significance at 10% level.
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he marginal effects are still negative. (3) The significant control
ariables have the expected signs.
Second, on the relationships with financial size, the following
ndings are apparent. (1) Both PCR and PCB have positive
ffects on the dependent variable, with the impact of the for-
er higher and (2) Increasing PCRs and PCBs beyond certain
hresholds lead to significant marginal effects but unfortuna-
ely, the modifying thresholds are not within range, notably:
7.57 (0.403/0.007) for PCR and 102.5 (0.205/0.002) for PCB.
4
cccordingly, the corresponding ranges provided by the sum-
ary statistics in Appendix B are respectively ‘0–49.8′ and
0–64.8′. (3) The significant control variables have the expected
igns..2. Further discussion and policy implications
We engage this section in four main strands, namely dis-
ussion on: (i) general findings in relation to surplus liquidity
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Table 3
Financial activity, financial size and information asymmetry.
Financial activity
Banking system activity (Pcrb) Financial system activity (Pcrbof) Financial size
Baseline PCR PCB Baseline PCR PCB Baseline PCR PCB
Constant −1.024 −2.411* −3.196*** 1.266 −0.027 −3.246*** 20.078*** 21.699*** 19.688***
(0.551) (0.087) (0.001) (0.468) (0.987) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Banking sys. activity (−1) 1.173*** 1.143*** 1.038*** – – – – – –
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Financial sys. activity (−1) – – – 1.150*** 1.125*** 1.058*** – – –
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Financial size (−1) – – – – – – 0.699*** 0.675*** 0.734***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Public credit registries (PCR) −0.171*** −0.068 – −0.120*** −0.054* – 0.134** 0.403*** –
(0.000) (0.166) (0.000) (0.097) (0.011) (0.000)
Private credit bureaus (PCB) −0.096*** – −0.003 −0.086*** – 0.048* 0.057** – 0.205***
(0.000) (0.921) (0.000) (0.076) (0.032) (0.000)
PCR×PCR – −0.001** – – −0.0008* – – −0.007*** –
(0.020) (0.075) (0.000)
PCB×PCB – – −0.0004 – – −0.001*** – – −0.002***
(0.307) (0.001) (0.000)
GDP growth 0.035 0.049 0.024 −0.013 0.020 0.016 0.047 −0.024 −0.018
(0.267) (0.147) (0.414) (0.733) (0.634) (0.615) (0.323) (0.575) (0.752)
Inflation −0.022 −0.016 −0.013 −0.036 −0.022 −0.019*** −0.107*** −0.100** −0.101**
(0.344) (0.347) (0.335) (0.161) (0.293) (0.034) (0.009) (0.019) (0.031)
Public investment 0.179*** 0.168*** 0.053* 0.156*** 0.145*** 0.069** 0.134* 0.141** 0.225***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.071) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.080) (0.037) (0.001)
Foreign aid 0.010 −0.019 0.048** −0.045 −0.052 0.044** −0.018 0.082 0.001
(0.811) (0.596) (0.012) (0.351) (0.201) (0.048) (0.828) (0.306) (0.988)
Trade −0.023 −0.008 0.031*** −0.040** −0.027* 0.023* 0.063*** 0.058** 0.020
(0.218) (0.607) (0.008) (0.025) (0.088) (0.062) (0.007) (0.023) (0.372)
AR(1) (0.043) (0.036) (0.013) (0.115) (0.085) (0.023) (0.076) (0.069) (0.060)
AR(2) (0.389) (0.229) (0.232) (0.178) (0.097) (0.113) (0.716) (0.706) (0.515)
Sargan OIR (0.170) (0.058) (0.000) (0.008) (0.010) (0.000) (0.603) (0.598) (0.768)
Hansen OIR (0.261) (0.494) (0.395) (0.292) (0.367) (0.254) (0.633) (0.730) (0.782)
DHT for instruments
(a) Instruments in levels
H excluding group (0.327) (0.257) (0.467) (0.260) (0.394) (0.433) (0.726) (0.426) (0.354)
Dif (null, H = exogenous) (0.277) (0.641) (0.351) (0.368) (0.363) (0.215) (0.471) (0.783) (0.883)
(b) IV (years, eq (diff))
H excluding group (0.535) (0.614) (0.549) (0.435) (0.320) (0.301) (0.665) (0.727) (0.872)
Dif (null, H = exogenous) (0.090) (0.265) (0.208) (0.182) (0.473) (0.274) (0.414) (0.499) (0.344)
Fisher 3115.95*** 20,933.4*** 5309.26*** 3495.71*** 12,445.2*** 15,962.7*** 379.52*** 853.78 *** 970.06***
Instruments 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37
Countries 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45
Observations 258 260 260 260 262 262 260 262 262
DHT: difference in Hansen test for exogeneity of instruments’ subsets; Dif: difference; OIR: over-identifying restrictions test; GDP: gross domestic product.
P-values in brackets. The significance of bold values is twofold: (1) the significance of estimated coefficients and the Fisher statistics and (2) the failure to reject the
null hypotheses of: (a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests; and (b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test, Hansen OIR test and DHT
tests.
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ssues in African financial institutions, (ii) specific findings
nd their relation with existing literature, (iii) quiet of life
ypothesis (QLH) and the role of information sharing offices
ISOs); (iv) relations to moral hazard on the part borrowers and
isciplinary effect from ISOs and (v) how ISOs can be tailored
owards addressing concerns of excess liquidity.
First, the concern about surplus liquidity in African finan-
ial institutions has been broadly confirmed from the findings.
u
b
mccordingly, the inability of banks to increase allocation effi-
iency and financial activity with the help of ISOs may imply
hat the use of PCR and PCB as means to addressing invest-
ent needs (through the fight against surplus liquidity) have not
ielded the expected outcomes. It is relevant to recall that the
nderlying issues of excess cash within formal banking esta-
lishments (Saxegaard, 2006; Fouda, 2009) represent one of the
ost important challenges in African business literature (Bartels
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(on the part of customers) and ISOs as a disciplinary device
for borrowers. The intuition here is that information sharing
by PCRs and PCBs may not be yielding the desired outcomes
3 The QLH is a postulation that, financial institutions with higher market power34 S.A. Asongu et al. / Review of De
t al., 2009; Tuomi, 2011; Kolstad & Wiig, 2011; Darley, 2012).
s a policy implication, in addition to improving the current
tructure and relevance of ISOs, other measures could be tailored
owards fighting surplus liquidity issues, notably on (i) volun-
ary holding of surplus liquidity (easing issues associated with
nterbank lending, facilitating banks to track their positions at
entral banks, inter alia) and (ii) involuntary holding of surplus
iquidity (developing regional stock markets for more investment
pportunities by banks, creating an enabling environment that
acilitates spreads between bonds and reserves, among others).
Second, it is important to also discuss our findings in the
ight of the existing literature engaged analytically in the intro-
uction. Accordingly, our findings could be summarised as the
ollowing. (1) PCR and PCB have negative effects on financial
epth, with the magnitude of the former higher. (2) Contrary to
CR which have insignificant effects, PCB has a negative impact
n banking system efficiency. (3) PCR and PCB have negative
ffects on financial activity, with the magnitude of the latter hig-
er. Moreover, marginal effects for both are negative. (4) Both
CR and PCB have positive effects on financial size, with the
ffect of the former higher. While marginal effects are positive,
orresponding thresholds are not within range.
The above findings substantially run counter to Singh et al.
2009) who have established that countries in Sub-Saharan
frica that encourage the sharing of credit information are more
ikely to be rewarded with higher levels of credit to the private
ector as a share of GDP. This measure of financial development
as been termed ‘financial activity’ in this line of inquiry. The
osition by Galindo and Miller (2001) that countries with more
dvanced development in credit registries are rewarded with less
nancial restrictions relative to those with credit bureaus that are
ess developed, can only be confirmed in our findings from the
erspective of financial size. In the same vein, the findings of
ove and Mylenko (2003) are also only partially confirmed.
ccording to the authors, the presence of private registries is
inked to a higher share of bank financing and lower finan-
ing constraints, whereas the presence of public registries do not
ppear to exert any significant impact on underlying financing
onstraints. It is important to note that the findings of Galindo
nd Miller (2001) and Love and Mylenko (2003) are based on
ifferent datasets. We are using a dataset that was collected after
heir studies were published. The findings of Singh et al. (2009)
re also based on data for average five-year intervals for the
eriod 1992–2006. This implies that just half of the last periodic
nterval (2001–2006) is considered in our dataset. Hence, diffe-
ences with prior literature could be traceable to differences in
eriodicities and proxies for ISOs.
We compare our findings with those of Triki and Gajigo
2014) in more depth because as far as we have reviewed, it
s the study in the literature closest to the current line of inquiry.
hey have concluded that access to finance is on average hig-
er in countries with PCBs relative to those with PCRs or
either institution. Our results confirm and reject the underl-
ing conclusion. First, on the rejection front, the following
nferences are apparent. (1) The results on financial efficiency
re broadly inconsistent in the view that contrary to PCRs which
ave insignificant consequences, PCBs exert a negative effect on
w
a
a
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anking system efficiency. Hence, it follows that PCBs are more
etrimental than PCRs when it comes to facilitating access to
nance. But it should be noted that this rejection is only partial
ecause we are comparing ‘significant positive effects’ from the
nderlying study with ‘insignificant and negative’ impacts. (2)
ith regard to financial size, we have established that while
CBs and PCRs exert positive effects on financial size, the
mpact of the latter is higher, which is contrary to the findings
f the underlying study which established that the impact of the
ormer is higher instead. Second, on the confirmation front, the
ollowing can be observed. (1) From the findings on financial
epth, there is (i) a confirmation if the comparison is exclusively
ased on magnitude of estimated coefficients and (ii) a rejection
f we are dealing with the signs of estimated coefficients. (2)
he discussion in (1) is also relevant to the findings on financial
fficiency.
The above comparative evidence also implies that the role
f ISOs on financial access in Africa is still open to much
ebate. Meanwhile, variations in findings could be traceable
o differences in indicators (or choice of financial development
ariables), periodicity (use of an updated sample) and methodo-
ogy (endogeneity-robust), which we have already outlined in
ection 1.
The third strand discusses corresponding concerns about the
quite of life hypothesis’ (QLH)3 enjoyed by financial institu-
ions and the role of ISOs (PCRs and PCRs). Accordingly, in
ight of the findings, we might be tempted to infer that instead
f improving financial access, African financial institutions are
aking advantage of information provided by ISOs to increase
heir profit margins. As to what concerns the role of an ISO, we
ay also be tempted to infer that these are not fulfilling their
issions as theoretically expected. This is essentially because
SOs are expected to reduce informational rents associated with
igh cost of credit (financial activity). Given that (i) ‘quite of
ife’ is enjoyed by big banks with substantial market power and
ii) ISOs are relevant to controlling the abuse of market power,
e may also be tempted to infer that banking competition is not
ery intense. Hence, the role of ISOs in financial development
n SSA may not be having the desired effects because they have
ot outweighed the power of big banks by, inter alia rendering
redit markets contestable, sharing information to enhance com-
etition and reducing informational rents (Pagano & Jappelli,
993, p. 2019). Hence, policy could use other measures to among
thers: (i) limit the financial market power of a few banks and
ii) enhance a competitive financial environment.
This leads us to the fourth strand, which discusses the possi-
le relationship between the findings of this paper, moral hazardould invest less in pursuing intermediation efficiency: instead of tailoring the
dvantage of their favourable position to granting more loans to borrowers at
ffordable prices, they would prefer to ‘exploit their market power’ for more
ains or enjoy a ‘quiter life’ (Coccorese & Pellecchia, 2010).
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Trade openness Trade Imports plus exports in World Bank (WDI)S.A. Asongu et al. / Review of De
n financial development because of continuous moral hazard
ssues from borrowers. Accordingly, even when banks have lost
ll potential informational rents from the activities of ISOs, they
ay still not be willing to lend if they are not motivated by a
igher repayment probability. This is essentially because, ISOs
lso play the role of a ‘discipline device’ for borrowers by provi-
ing incentives to perform and reduce moral hazard. In this light,
policy implication may be tailored with the assumption that,
SOs are not effective at disciplining borrowers to reduce their
oral hazard because of a plethora of reasons, among others:
orrowers are not afraid to lose their reputation, corruption in
ending may be rampant and recourse to financing mechanisms
rom the informal financial sector could be a genuine and reliable
lternative.
In the fifth strand, ISOs can leverage on growing synch-
onisation of information through the ‘knowledge economy’
nd ‘information and communication technologies”-oriented
uman resources in order to address concerns deeply entren-
hed in involuntary and voluntary keeping of excess liquidity
y banks. First, with regard to the voluntary keeping of excess
ash, the suggested orientations would strengthen the capa-
ility of ISOs to: (i) ease interbank lending, especially for
ontingency purposes, (ii) overcome concerns about transpor-
ation which constrain bank branches in enclaved zones in
eeping excess reserves and (iii) avoid the keeping of reser-
es beyond statutory limits by reducing difficulties that banks
ncounter when it comes to updating their positions in central
anks.
Second, ISOs can also leverage on the underlying ‘knowledge
conomy’ and ‘information and communication technology’
nstruments in order to limit the involuntary holding of surplus
iquidity by: (i) enhancing competition in lending between finan-
ial institutions, (ii) easing the possibility of financial institutions
o invest in bond markets, (iii) enlarging opportunities of invest-
ent in regional stock markets by banks and (iv) reducing the
nability of banks to lend when interest rates are regulated. To be
ore effective, the engaged instruments should be characterised
ith the following: (i) high-speed access to the internet that is
eliable, (ii) ‘state of the art’ systems of information mechanisms
n ISOs and banks and (iii) regular training of staff in ISOs as
ell as leveraging on mobile banking.
. Conclusion and future research directions
We have examined policy thresholds of information sharing
or financial development in 53 African countries for the period
004–2011. Public credit registries (PCRs) and private credit
ureaus (PCBs) are used as proxies for reducing information
symmetry whereas financial development is measured in terms
f depth, efficiency, activity and size. The empirical evidence is
ased on interactive generalised methods of moments with for-
ard orthogonal deviations. The following findings have been
stablished. First, PCRs and PCBs have negative effects on finan-
ial depth, with the magnitude of the former higher. Second,
ontrary to PCRs which have insignificant effects, PCBs have a
egative impact on banking system efficiency. Third, PCRs and
CBs have negative effects on financial activity, with the mag-
W
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itude of the latter higher. Moreover, marginal effects for both
re negative. Fourth, PCRs and PCBs have positive effects on
nancial size, with the effect of the former higher. While margi-
al effects are positive, corresponding thresholds are not within
ange.
The above findings have shown that, with the exception of
nancial size, the introduction of information sharing offices
n Africa as a policy of increasing financial access have ins-
ead, for the most part led to the opposite effects. We have
lso investigated whether increasing the number of underl-
ing registries/bureaus would result in the expected effects.
nfortunately, we are tempted to infer that reducing informa-
ion asymmetry is not enhancing financial allocation efficiency
nd facilitating the availability of credit. This naturally lea-
es enough room for future research, notably in (i) more
n-depth analysis on the relevance of information sharing
ffices and (ii) mechanisms by which their missions could
e fulfilled. Moreover, assessing the relevance of informa-
ion sharing offices throughout the conditional distributions
f the financial dynamics could also yield interesting policy
irections.
cknowledgements
The authors are indebted to the editor and referees for cons-
ructive comments.
ppendix A. Variable deﬁnitions
ariables Signs Variable definitions Sources
conomic financial
depth
M2 Money supply (% of GDP) World Bank
(FDSD)
inancial system
depth
Fdgdp Liquid liabilities (% of
GDP)
World Bank
(FDSD)
anking system
efficiency
BcBd Bank credit on bank
deposits
World Bank
(FDSD)
inancial system
efficiency
FcFd Financial credit on financial
deposits
World Bank
(FDSD)
anking system
activity
Prcb Private domestic credit
from deposit banks (% of
GDP)
World Bank
(FDSD)
inancial system
activity
Prcbof Private domestic credit
from financial institutions
(% of GDP)
World Bank
(FDSD)
inancial size Dbacba Deposit bank assets on
central bank assets plus
deposit bank assets
World Bank
(FDSD)
nformation
asymmetry
PCR Public credit registry
coverage (% of adults)
World Bank (WDI)
PCB Private credit bureau
coverage (% of adults)
World Bank (WDI)
conomic prosperity GDPg GDP growth (annual %) World Bank (WDI)
nflation Infl Consumer price index
(annual %)
World Bank (WDI)
ublic investment PubIvt Gross public investment (%
of GDP)
World Bank (WDI)
evelopment
assistance
NODA Total net official
development assistance (%
of GDP)
World Bank (WDI)commodities (% of GDP)
DI: World Bank development indicators; FDSD: financial development and
tructure database.
1A
F
d
I
a
C
b
p
d
A
F
F
M
1
M
d
a
p
A
M
F
B
F
P
P
D
M
d
a36 S.A. Asongu et al. / Review of Development Finance 6 (2016) 126–138
ppendix B. Summary statistics (2004–2011)
Variables Mean SD Min Max Observations
inancial
evelopment
Economic financial depth (M2) 34.279 22.294 6.363 112.83 377
Financial system depth (Fdgdp) 28.262 21.066 2.926 92.325 377
Banking system efficiency (BcBd) 68.118 27.725 14.804 171.85 402
Financial system efficiency (FcFd) 68.118 27.725 14.804 171.85 402
Banking system activity (Pcrb) 72.722 35.884 22.200 252.88 377
Financial system activity (Pcrbof) 21.571 24.154 0.010 149.77 379
Financial size (Dbacba) 78.073 20.255 4.032 99.949 399
nformation
symmetry
Public credit registries (PCR) 2.155 5.812 0 49.8 381
Private credit bureaus (PCB) 4.223 13.734 0 64.8 380
ontrol variables Economic prosperity (GDPg) 4.996 4.556 −17.66 37.998 404
Inflation 7.801 4.720 0 43.011 357
Public investment 74.778 1241.70 −8.974 24,411 387
Development assistance 10.396 12.958 0.027 147.05 411
Trade openness (trade) 80.861 32.935 24.968 186.15 392
SD: standard deviation; Min: minimum; Max: maximum; M2: money supply; Fdgdp: financial deposits (liquid liabilities); BcBd:
ank credit on bank deposits; FcFd: financial credit on financial deposits; Pcrb: private domestic credit from deposit banks; Pcrbof:
rivate domestic credit from deposit banks and other financial institutions; Dbacba: deposit bank assets on central bank assets plus
eposit bank assets; GDPg: GDP growth.
ppendix C. Correlation analysis (uniform sample size: 291)
inancial development dynamics Info. asymmetry Other variables
inancial depth Financial efficiency Financial activity Fin. size PCR PCB GDPg Inflation PubIvt NODA Trade
2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Prcb Pcrbof Dbacba
.000 0.970 0.094 0.103 0.821 0.629 0.398 0.416 0.147 −0.104 −0.080 0.055 −0.295 0.140 M2
1.000 0.130 0.220 0.886 0.754 0.452 0.409 0.303 −0.091 −0.063 0.070 −0.320 0.149 Fdgdp
1.000 0.859 0.490 0.495 0.243 0.154 0.303 −0.016 −0.144 −0.169 −0.133 −0.176 Bcbd
1.000 0.583 0.743 0.242 0.067 0.510 −0.056 −0.097 −0.149 −0.179 −0.189 FcFd
1.000 0.922 0.478 0.448 0.439 −0.092 −0.089 −0.055 −0.343 0.093 Pcrb
1.000 0.413 0.293 0.556 −0.088 −0.073 −0.057 −0.324 0.019 Pcrbof
1.000 0.249 0.343 −0.061 −0.142 0.198 −0.403 0.210 Dbacba
1.000 −0.140 −0.026 −0.081 0.068 −0.154 0.207 PCR
1.000 −0.101 −0.035 −0.047 −0.329 0.084 PCB
1.000 −0.169 0.129 0.122 0.037 GDPg
1.000 −0.081 −0.0004 −0.006 Inflation
1.000 0.059 0.130 PubIvt
1.000 −0.309 NODA
1.000 Trade
2: money supply; Fdgdp: financial deposits (liquid liabilities); BcBd: bank credit on bank deposits; FcFd: financial credit on financial deposits; Pcrb: private
omestic credit from deposit banks; Pcrbof: private domestic credit from deposit banks and other financial institutions; Dbacba: deposit bank assets on central bank
ssets plus deposit bank assets; Info: information; PCR: public credit registries; PCB: private credit bureaus; GDPg: GDP growth; Popg: population growth; PubIvt:
ublic investment; NODA: net official development assistance; Info: information.
ppendix D. Persistence of the dependent variables
Financial depth Financial efficiency Financial activity Fin. size
M2 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrd Pcrdof Dbacba
2 (−1) 0.9837
dgdp (−1) 0.990
cBd (−1) 0.9438
cFd (−1) 0.9815
crd (−1) 0.9919
crdof (−1) 0.9945
bacba (−1) 0.93302: money supply; Fdgdp: financial deposits (liquid liabilities); BcBd: bank credit on bank deposits; FcFd: financial credit on financial deposits; Pcrb: private
omestic credit from deposit banks; Pcrbof: private domestic credit from deposit banks and other financial institutions; Dbacba: deposit bank assets on central bank
ssets plus deposit bank assets; M2 (−1): lagged value of money supply; Fin: financial.
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